Etkinlikler

The Sound of Dersim: Musical Tradition and Revival in an Eastern Anatolian Province

The Effect of Firing Costs on Worker Productivity and Turnover: Theory and Evidence

The Politics of Post-conict and Post-disaster Reconstruction Nexus Nepal

The Rise of Indigenous Ottoman Viziers in the Sixteenth Century

Domestic Model of Audience Costs When Can They Tie Hands According to conventional wisdom, a leaders public commitment can help states tackle asymmetric information about resolve and intention, which is a major cause of conflict in international bargaining. This hinges on a strong assumption that citizens always politically punish a leader if (s)he reneges on the commitment. Relaxing the assumption, this study offers a domestic model that explains under what conditions citizens punish their leader, and when these punishments make the leader fulfill the commitment.

Keeping It in the Family: Female Inheritance, Inmarriage, and the Status of Women

Robust Maximum Likelihood Updating

Spousal Labor Supply Response to Job Displacement and Implications for Optimal Transfers

Family History and Attitudes Toward Outgroups: Evidence from the European Refugee Crisis (with Vicky Fouka and Alain Schlaepfer)

Sovereign Debt Overhang, Expenditure Composition, and Debt Restructurings