(1993) “Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts,” International Economic Review 34, 663-683. (1995) “On the Term Structure of Sovereign Debt Contracts,” Review of International Economics 3, 174-185. (1996a) “Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 22, 99-118. (Presented at the third meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Maastricht, The Netherlands 1996; eleventh meeting of the European Economic Association, Istanbul, Turkey 1996). (1996b) (with Horst Raff) “Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preferences,” Games and Economic Behavior 13, 125-134. (Presented at the ASSET Meeting, Alicante, Spain 1996). (1996c) Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30, 301-315. Beijer Institute Discussion Paper, 1995, no 60, Stockholm, Sweden. (Presented at the seventh world congress of the Econometric Society, Tokyo, Japan 1995). (1996d) “Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride,” Social Choice and Welfare 13, 419-432. (1996e) “Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12, 277-298. (Presented at the Workshop on Economic Design, Marmaris, Turkey 1994). (1997a) (with Horst Raff) “A Theory of Trade Concessions,” Journal of International Economics 42, 483-504. (Presented at the European meeting of the Econometric Society, Uppsala, Sweden 1993, Mid-West International Economics Meeting, Wisconsin-Madison 1993). (1997b) “Bilateral Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153, 319-333. (Presented at the European meeting of the Econometric Society, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 1994) (1998a) “The Scope, Timing and Type of Corruption,” International Review of Law and Economics 12, 101-120. (1998b) “Property Rights Regimes and the Management of Resources,” Natural Resources Forum 22, 263-269. (1999a) (with Ismail Saglam) “Managerial Defections, Promotion Criteria and Firm Growth,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 17, 917-940. (1999b) “Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt,” Review of International Economics 7, 322-327. (2000a) “A Note on Efficient Signaling of Bargaining Power,” International Journal of Game Theory 29, 119-126. (2000b) “Signaling Bargaining Power: Strategic Delay versus Restricted Offers,” Economic Theory 16, 227-237. (2000c) “On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening,” Journal of Labor Economics 18, 681-701. (2000d) “Switching Costs and Screening Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts,” Canadian Journal of Economics 33, 1034-1048. (2001a) “To Invest or Screen Efficiently: A Potential Conflict in Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 567-588. (2001b) “Corruption, Connections and transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?” Public Choice 107, 87-96. (2001c) “On Creating and Claiming Value in Negotiations,” Group Decision and Negotiation 10, 237-251. (2001d) (with Parimal Kanti Bag) “Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions,” Journal of Comparative Economics. 29: 722-748. (Presented at the eighth world congress of the Econometric Society, Seattle, USA 2000)